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Abstract 
The EU is a major participant in the world sugar market, being one of the top producers, 
importers and exporters in the world. The reform of the EU sugar regime will affect not 
only the EU member states and candidates, but also countries that are associated with 
the EU through the preferential, regional and multilateral trade agreements. For several 
decades, the EU has supported and protected the EU sugar sector. Sugar from 
developing countries will not be able to enter the EU sugar market without preferential 
trade agreements. In the EU sugar regime, the unique features of the trade concessions 
are that sugar under preferential import quotas can enter the EU market duty-free and 
the price paid for sugar equals to the high EU price for sugar. This paper attempts to 
analyse the complex hierarchy of trade arrangements between the EU and specific 
groups of countries. It compares the different trade agreements – including those 
achieved under the WTO – and explores the impact of these upon both the EU and the 
other countries involved.    
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AND MULTILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 
ON THE EU SUGAR REGIME 
ENARPRI WORKING PAPER NO. 1 
ELLEN HUAN-NIEMI AND JYRKI NIEMI 
 
1.   Introduction 
The European Union (EU) is a major participant in the world sugar market. In 1999, the 
EU was placed second in the ranking of all the major producers, exporters and importers 
in the world (see Table 1). The EU, Brazil, Australia, Thailand and Cuba accounted for 
about 70% of world exports in 1999. The EU and Brazil are the dominators in the world 
sugar trade, being the top producers and exporters in the world. Although the EU is also 
a major importer of sugar, sugar imports in Brazil are negligible. The EU is unique in 
being both a major exporter of white sugar and an importer of raw sugar in the world 
market. 
Table 1. World sugar market in 1999 (in raw sugar equivalent and million of tonnes) 
Rank  Five largest producers  Five largest exporters  Five largest importers 
1 Brazil  20.6  Brazil  12.5  Russia  5.8 
2  EU 19.3  EU 5.1 EU 1.9 
3 India  17.4  Australia  4.2  Indonesia  1.9 
4 China  9.3  Thailand  3.4  USA  1.6 
5 USA  8.2  Cuba  3.1  Japan  1.6 
Totals  World 136.3  World 39.5  World 38.4 
Source: ISO 1999. 
 
The dominant role of the EU in the world sugar market is the result of the high level of 
support the EU is providing to its sugar sector, compared with the member countries of 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The EU uses export subsidies to bridge the gap 
between the high internal EU market price and the significantly lower world market 
price. In the previous years, the world market for sugar has been characterised by 
considerable overproduction and a rising level of stocks. The ratio of stocks as a 
percentage of world sugar consumption escalated from 35.92% in 1992/1993 to 48.81% 
in 2001/2002. World stocks are now at a high level, which has had the effect of 
depressing prices. World sugar production in 2001/2002 was 136 million tonnes, with 
consumption at 134 million tonnes. In 2000/2001, world sugar production was 128 
million tonnes with consumption at 130 million tonnes. Approximately 28% of world 
sugar production is traded in the world market whilst the balance is consumed in the 
country of origin. Global sugar consumption continues to increase at an average of 2% 
per annum.  H UAN-NIEMI AND NIEMI 
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The EU Common Market Organisation (CMO) of sugar has established minimum 
support prices for sugar guaranteed by an intervention purchase system. A production 
quota system was established to limit the total quantity eligible for price support. The 
EU sugar producers (growers and processors jointly) are responsible for paying the full 
costs to the EU budget of surplus quota-sugar disposal through the producer levies. 
There are two types of quotas: A and B. The major difference between A and B quota-
sugar is the level of imposed producer levies. Only quota-sugar can be sold in the EU 
and is eligible for price support through the intervention mechanism and export refunds. 
Sugar produced in excess of the A and B quotas is called C-sugar and cannot be 
marketed in the EU. C-sugar has to be sold on the world market without the support of 
export refunds/export subsidies. Thus, the quota system limits the supply of sugar in the 
EU internal market (CAP Monitor). 
The EU internal market is insulated from the world sugar market through a system of 
import duties and export refunds. The CMO of sugar supports producer prices at levels 
above world market prices, stimulating production in the EU and resulting in exportable 
surpluses of sugar. Consequently, the EU has been distorting trade flows by disposing 
the sugar surpluses to the world market with export subsidies. 
Although the CMO of sugar exhibits a high degree of protectionism, the EU has granted 
a whole array of bilateral trade concessions to certain developing countries since its 
creation. Over the years, the EU has established a complex system of trade 
arrangements, which is reflected in the complex network of discriminatory tariffs and 
through generalised, country-specific or region-specific trade preferences. Thus, the EU 
sugar trade policy has deviated widely from the non-discrimination principle of the 
WTO, and it applies different policies to different regions and trading blocs. These 
country-specific trade concessions reflect in part the multiplicity of the EU’s foreign 
policy interests, ranging from old colonial responsibilities to military-strategic 
considerations (Harris and Tangermann 1993). 
Currently, the EU is engaged in negotiating or implementing trade agreements that are 
unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral in nature. In addition, the EU enlargement 
process will cause trade effects that will have important interactions with other trade 
agreements as well (see Figure 1 at the top of the next page). 
This paper attempts to analyse the complex hierarchy of trade arrangements between the 
EU and specific groups of countries vis-à-vis the EU sugar regime. It examines the 
nature of the different trade agreements that affect the EU sugar regime (including the 
WTO, Central and Eastern European Countries [CEECs], African, Caribbean and 
Pacific [ACP] Countries, Least Developed Countries [LDCs], Overseas Countries and 
Territories [OCTs] and the Western Balkans), and compares the different trade 
agreements and explores the interaction among them.  
  T HE IMPACT OF PREFERENTIAL, REGIONAL AND MULTILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 
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Figure 1. The EU sugar regime and trade agreements 
 
2.  The different trade agreements 
2.1  The World Trade Organisation – multilateral agreement 
Within the WTO, the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) established a 
set of rules for agriculture to reduce agricultural export subsidies, create new rules for 
agricultural import policy, shift domestic support of agriculture away from those 
practices that affect production and trade flows, and agree on disciplines for sanitary 
and phytosanitary trade measures. 
2.1.1   The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture 
The required reduction for export subsidies in the volume of exports and budgetary 
outlays did not cause any difficulties for the EU at the beginning of the Uruguay Round 
implementation period. At the end of the implementation period, however, the export 
subsidy commitments became very binding (Huan-Niemi, 2003a). In order to stay 
within the final marketing year commitments of 2000/2001, there was a ‘temporary cut’ 
of 498,800 tonnes in the total A and B-sugar quotas. Hence, the amount of the EU’s 
subsidised sugar exports (A & B quota-sugar) has decreased while the unsubsidised 
sugar exports (C-sugar) have increased during the Uruguay Round (Devadoss and 
Kropf, 1996).  
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Under the URAA, the EU was obliged to replace the ad valorem import duties with 
fixed standard tariffs. The standard tariffs were gradually reduced by a total of 20% 
over six years. These standard tariffs were fixed at a high base-level, owing to the 
methods of converting the equivalent of non-tariff barriers into fixed standard tariffs. In 
reality, the Special Safeguard Provisions for sugar have remained in constant operation 
since 1995, because of the low world market prices for sugar. The fixed standard tariffs 
and the additional import duties under the safeguard measures have made the import of 
non-preferential sugar uneconomic in comparison with the price of EU quota-sugar in 
the internal market. Likewise, the minimum access commitments under the URAA have 
not increased sugar imports to the EU because the EU was importing more than 10% 
(well above the 5% requirement by the year 2000 to 2001) of consumption under its 
preferential trade agreement with the ACPs and India. 
The EU was not required to reduce its internal price support specifically for sugar under 
the URAA, because domestic support is measured as the Aggregate Measurement of 
Support (AMS), aggregated across all commodities and policy instruments. 
Subsequently, the total reduction of 20% over a period of six years for domestic support 
commitments refer to the total levels of support, but not to individual commodities. 
Overall, the sector-wide domestic support for sugar has been high compared with the 
other agricultural commodities in the EU, because of the high intervention price for 
sugar. The domestic support for sugar will remain high unless the intervention price for 
sugar is lowered closer to the world market price. 
2.1.2   The forthcoming Doha Round 
Further reductions in the export subsidy commitments 
The EU has proposed cuts to export subsidies by 45%, but the Cairns Group has 
proposed eliminating export subsidies by the end of the new WTO round (Doha Round) 
for agriculture (WTO, 2002). The WTO’s first draft of ‘modalities’ for further 
commitments in the new WTO round or the so-called ‘Harbinson Proposal’ has 
recommended abolishing export subsidies within five to nine years (WTO, 2003). 
It will be hard for the EU to agree to abolish the use of export subsidies within five to 
nine years, but the EU will be able to stay within the export subsidy commitments with 
a 50% reduction in the amount of subsidised exports within six years. Nevertheless, the 
EU may resort to cutting the production quotas yearly, when the EU is in danger of 
breaching the commitments for export subsidy in a particular marketing year, owing to 
higher output (mainly because of good weather and the area planted). The cut in the 
production quotas will only be temporary for that particular marketing year.
1 This 
projection is sensitive to the rate of sugar consumption growth in the EU. The EU may 
risk breaching the quantity commitments that have been established for sugar or have to 
                                                           
1 European Commission Regulation (EC) No 1745/2002 of 30 September 2002 reduces the EU sugar 
production quotas by a quantity of 862,475 tonnes for marketing year 2002/2003, with regard to European 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/2001 of 19 June 2001, on the common organisation of the markets in 
the sugar sector. According to European Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/2001, under Article 10(3) and 
(4), the guaranteed quantity under production quotas should be reduced before 1 October each marketing 
year if the forecasts for the year in question show an exportable balance (attracting an export 
refund/export subsidy) greater than the maximum laid down by the Agriculture Agreement (URAA) 
concluded under Article 300(2) of the Treaty.   T HE IMPACT OF PREFERENTIAL, REGIONAL AND MULTILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 
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resort to cutting the sugar production quotas, if the consumption growth for sugar is 
lower than a 0.5% yearly average (see Huan-Niemi, 2003a). 
Nevertheless, the EU will breach the budgetary commitments for export subsidy with a 
50% reduction in commitments within six years, if the average subsidy per tonne for 
sugar is higher than €460. In order to stay within the budgetary commitments under a 
50% reduction scenario, the average subsidy per tonne has to be lower than €460. 
Compared to the quantity commitments for export subsidy, the budgetary commitments 
for sugar are more binding. The expenditure for export subsidy is dependent on the 
amount of subsidised sugar exports and the strength of the euro (Huan-Niemi, 2003a).  
Further reductions in the import tariffs 
The EU Commission is proposing an overall average tariff reduction of 36% and a 
minimum reduction per tariff line of 15%, as agreed in the Uruguay Round; it has 
rejected the ‘Swiss formula’ proposed by the Cairns Group for tariff reduction. The 
problem for the EU is that the Swiss formula will cut high tariffs more than low tariffs, 
ensuring no individual tariff exceeds 25%. Sensitive products such as sugar will be 
pressured to go through drastic reforms to protect the EU border from massive imports 
if this formula is to be implemented in the new WTO round for agriculture. Meanwhile, 
the WTO has proposed a reduction to import tariffs by an average of 60%, and a 
minimum reduction of 45% for tariffs greater than 90% in an ad-valorem basis (the ad-
valorem equivalent tariff for EU raw sugar is 169.5%). 
The EU has proposed not only to continue the Uruguay Round formula for further tariff 
reductions, but also to continue the use of the Special Safeguard Clause (SSG) or 
‘Special Safeguard Provisions’ for both developed and developing countries. 
Conversely, the Cairns Group has proposed the Swiss formula for further tariff 
reductions and to discontinue the use of the Special Safeguard Provisions for developed 
countries. Furthermore, the Harbinson Proposal also includes a proposition to 
discontinue the use of the Special Safeguard Provisions for developed countries, so that 
only developing countries are allowed to use this safeguard measure.  
Projections according to the EU proposal: the Uruguay Round formula and the Special 
Safeguard Provisions allowed for developed countries 
Even if the Uruguay Round formula proposed by the EU is accepted in the WTO for 
further tariff reductions, the EU sugar regime cannot sustain a 36% reduction in tariffs 
without cutting the intervention price for sugar. The EU will lose its border protection 
for raw sugar in the assumed new WTO round if the standard tariff for EU raw sugar is 
further reduced by 36%. The import price (the world market price plus the tariff) for 
raw sugar from the world market will be lower than the intervention price for EU raw 
sugar (€523). Under a strong euro,
2 even the additional safeguard duties provided by the 
Special Safeguard Provisions are not enough to provide border protection. The 
intervention price for EU raw sugar has to be lowered if the standard tariff for EU raw 
sugar is lowered by 36%. Nevertheless, a 25% cut in the intervention price for raw 
sugar (earlier suggested by the EU Commission) will be adequate to provide the border 
                                                           
2 A strong euro is defined as: €1 = $1.20.  H UAN-NIEMI AND NIEMI 
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protection for EU raw sugar. In spite of this, the safeguard duties are needed to provide 
the border protection for EU raw sugar under a ‘strong euro’ (Huan-Niemi, 2003b). 
Although the probability is low, the EU sugar regime can avoid reforms or cuts in the 
intervention price in the new WTO round, if at least three conditions occur at the same 
time:  
1)  the Uruguay Round formula is accepted as the reduction method in the new WTO 
round and the EU can use the minimum reduction rate of 15% for sugar;  
2)  world sugar prices recover in the future; and  
3)  both developed and developing countries are allowed to use the Special Safeguard 
Provisions (Huan-Niemi, 2003b). 
Projections according to the Cairns Group Proposal: the Swiss formula 
The EU will no doubt lose its border protection for raw sugar in the assumed new WTO 
round if the standard tariff for EU raw sugar is further reduced according to the Cairns 
Group Proposal, using the Swiss formula. Moreover, a 25% cut in the intervention price 
for raw sugar is not sufficient to provide border protection for the EU sugar regime. The 
intervention price needs to be lowered by two-thirds (67%) in order to maintain the 
border protection for sugar. In this case, the intervention price for EU raw sugar is very 
close to the world market price under a ‘strong euro’, and the intervention price is lower 
than the world market price under a ‘weak euro’.
3 Thus, the intervention price system is 
no longer applicable in the EU sugar regime and a ‘safety net’ system would most 
probably replace the intervention price system (Huan-Niemi, 2003b).  
Projections according to the Harbinson Proposal 
The EU will certainly lose its border protection for raw sugar in the assumed new WTO 
round if the standard tariff for EU raw sugar is further reduced by 60% according to the 
Harbinson Proposal. In addition, a 25% cut in the intervention price for raw sugar is not 
sufficient to provide border protection. In order to maintain the border protection for EU 
raw sugar under this reduction percentage, the intervention price needs to be lowered by 
45% or nearly half (Huan-Niemi, 2003b). 
The EU can also choose the minimum reduction percentage of 45% under the 
Harbinson Proposal. Similar to the 60% reduction in tariff, the EU will lose its border 
protection for raw sugar in the assumed new WTO round if the standard tariff for EU 
raw sugar is further reduced by 45%. Although the EU will be able to sustain its border 
protection with a 25% cut in the intervention price for raw sugar under a ‘weak euro’, it 
will be incapable of maintaining its border protection under a ‘strong euro’. In this case, 
the intervention price needs to be lowered by 35% in order to maintain the border 
protection for raw sugar (Huan-Niemi, 2003b). 
2.1.3 The WTO challenge on EU sugar exports 
Australia, Brazil and Thailand have formally launched WTO action against the EU 
sugar regime. These countries are claiming that EU exporters of ‘C-sugar’ 
(unsubsidised) are able to export C-sugar at prices below their production cost because 
                                                           
3 A weak euro is defined as: €1 =$0.80.  T HE IMPACT OF PREFERENTIAL, REGIONAL AND MULTILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 
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of the cross-subsidy from the main A and B quota-sugar of the EU sugar regime. 
Therefore, these countries are challenging in the WTO that C-sugar exports are in 
contravention of the commitments made by the EU in the WTO on subsidised sugar 
exports. 
This WTO challenge is a significant threat to the future exports of C-sugar from the EU 
sugar regime. The reason it is a threat is that there is already a precedent case in the 
WTO, with regard to the cross-subsidisation of exports. The pricing for C-sugar and 
quota-sugar is similar to the two-tier milk pricing system in Canada. The WTO found 
that Canada’s dairy programmes provided export subsidies to its dairy processors and 
farmers above the level to which Canada committed to comply in the WTO. Canadian 
dairy farmers sold milk at discounted prices to Canadian processors under the 
Commercial Export Milk (CEM) programme, which gave Canadian dairies an 
advantage in selling to foreign markets. Now, Canada has agreed to stop exporting 
subsidised (cross-subsidised) dairy products to the US and will significantly limit these 
exports to other countries, as part of an agreed settlement to reform its dairy support 
programme, which was ruled illegal by the WTO. This WTO ruling ended a lengthy 
five-year dispute involving six panel decisions and no fewer than four appeals (Agra 
Europe, 2003a). 
2.2  The Central and Eastern European countries – bilateral agreements (Free 
Trade Agreements/European agreements) before EU accession and Common 
Custom Union after EU accession 
2.2.1   The EU enlargement 
Under EU enlargement, ten new member states are ready to join the EU by 2004, 
consisting of Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Slovakia, Cyprus and Malta. Bulgaria and Romania are expected to join the EU by 
2007. The EU Commission will impose new sugar production quotas after EU 
enlargement. It is assumed that the new member states will receive sugar production 
quotas equal to the EU Commission’s quota allocation for each country (Commission of 
European Communities, 2002).  
The sugar production quotas agreed between the CEECs and the EU Commission are 
below the initial requests by the CEECs. The overall EU sugar production quotas will 
increase by 2.96 million tonnes in 2004 and an estimated 3.22 million tonnes in 2007 
(see Table 2). In the first wave of enlargement, the CEECs will be producing more 
quota-sugar than consumption, with quota production exceeding consumption by nearly 
50,000 tonnes. Yet, according to the rules specified by the EU Commission, the sugar 
consumption of Bulgaria and Romania will exceed their entitlement of quota-sugar 
production. In fact, the CEECs’ sugar consumption will exceed quota-sugar production 
by an estimated 430,000 tonnes in 2007. Consequently, the accession of the CEECs will 
not be a burden on the EU sugar regime.  
 
 
  H UAN-NIEMI AND NIEMI 
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Table 2. Central and Eastern European countries’ sugar production quotas, consumption 
and potential ‘current access’ for non-member countries (in tonnes) 
  A-quotas B-quotas  Total  quotas 
(Production)
Total 
Consumption
Production 
minus 
Consumption 
Potential ‘current 
access’ for non-
member countries
c
Czech Rep.  441,209  13,653  454,862 441,409 13,453   
Estonia
a Nil  Nil  Nil  50,000  -50,000   
Hungary 400,454  1,230  401,684  378,791  22,893   
Latvia 66,400  105  66,505  70,000  -3,495  11,410 
Lithuania 103,010  Nil  103,010  96,241  6,769   
Poland 1,580,000 91,927  1,671,927  1,590,533  81,394   
Slovakia 189,760  17,672 207,432  195,000  12,432   
Slovenia 48,157 4,816  52,973  87,000  -34,027  2,875 
Bulgaria
b 7,000  700  7,700  206,000  -198,300  196,345 
Romania
b  225,000 25,500  250,500  532,000  -281,500  278,049 
TOTAL  3,060,990 155,603 3,216,593  3,646,974  -430,381  488,679 
TOTAL 
Excluding 
Bulgaria & 
Romania 
2,828,990 129,403 2,958,393  2,908,974  49,419  14,285 
 
a   Estonia, Malta and Cyprus do not produce sugar;  therefore, the EU Commission did not allocate sugar production quotas to these 
countries. 
b  Production quotas and consumption figures are estimated according to EU Commission rules. 
c  Historical quantities of sugar imported by the CEECs are potential ‘current-access quotas’ for countries outside the EU after 
enlargement.  
Sources: CEC 2002, EUROSTAT COMEXT, FAOSTAT, Interactive TradeMap and PC-TAS. 
 
Under the WTO rules, non-member countries have to be compensated for their market 
access in the countries that are joining a common custom union like the EU, if the 
‘current access’ of the non-member countries in the markets of the accession countries 
is jeopardised due to the common custom union. The CEECs are currently importing 
sugar not only from the EU member states and candidates, but also from non-member 
countries like Brazil, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Mexico, Cuba and Australia. Current-
access quotas were allocated to Brazil, Cuba and other non-member countries after the 
accession of Finland, Austria and Sweden in 1995.
4 The EU has undertaken to import 
85,463 tonnes of raw sugar as part of its current-access commitment due the agreement 
under the GATT.
5 As a result, the EU has to either allocate current-access quotas for 
sugar imports from Brazil, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Mexico, Cuba and Australia or 
compensate these countries in other ways such as market access in other EU markets or 
compensatory payments to these countries. The potential current-access quotas for non-
member countries are estimated to be about 490,000 tonnes in the enlarged EU sugar 
regime by including Bulgaria and Romania (see Table 2). Overall, the part of the 
CEECs’ sugar consumption that exceeds quota production will be matched by the 
                                                           
4 European Commission Regulation (EC) No 1507/96 of 29 July 1996 opening and providing for the 
administration of certain tariff import quotas for the supply of raw cane sugar to Community refineries. 
5 General Agreement on Tariff and Trade.  T HE IMPACT OF PREFERENTIAL, REGIONAL AND MULTILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 
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allocation of potential current-access quotas for non-member countries’ historical 
market access in the sugar markets of the CEECs. If the current access of non-member 
countries is compensated in other ways than allocating sugar import quotas, the 
‘additional consumption’ of the CEECs will alleviate the current overproduction 
pressures in the current EU-15 member states. 
2.2.2   The Doha Round and EU enlargement 
An EU with 25 member states
6 (including Romania and Bulgaria, but excluding Malta 
and Cyprus) should be able to stay within the export subsidy commitments for sugar in 
the new WTO round, if the current commitments are further reduced by 50% within six 
years. The ten CEECs will bring in additional export subsidy commitments for sugar 
after EU accession, without bringing in additional subsidised sugar exports. This result 
is based on the assumptions that the new member states will receive sugar production 
quotas equal to the EU Commission’s quota allocation for each country and EU sugar 
consumption would grow on average by 0.5% per year (Huan-Niemi, 2003a).  
After accession to the EU, the CEECs will be included in the common market 
organisation for EU sugar. Therefore, the CEECs will have support price or intervention 
price and border protection systems exactly like the current EU-15 member states. The 
projections mentioned earlier for border protection in the forthcoming Doha Round 
apply not only for the current EU-15 member states, but also apply to the CEECs. 
Overall, the EU sugar regime is sensitive to steep tariff reductions because of the huge 
difference between the EU support prices and world market prices for sugar. If the 
forthcoming Doha Round requires substantial tariff reductions, the EU could be forced 
to reduce the intervention prices for sugar in order to avoid large increases in sugar 
imports (Poonyth et al., 2000). In addition, the Special Safeguard Provisions under the 
URAA plays a major role in upholding the border protection for sugar. It is uncertain 
whether the Special Safeguard Provisions will continue to be a safeguard feature for 
developed countries such as those in the EU. The border protection for EU sugar will be 
very vulnerable without this safeguard feature. 
2.3  The African, Caribbean and Pacific countries – preferential agreements 
(Cotonou Agreement) with unilateral concessions until 2008 and regional 
trade agreements after 2008 
In 2001, EU trade with the ACPs totalled over €58 billion, with EU imports totalling 
€31 billion and EU exports totalling €27 billion. For most of the ACPs and virtually all 
African ACPs, the EU is the main trading partner. In order to enhance the contribution 
of trade to development, the ACP states and the EU decided to completely overhaul 
their previous trade relations. Whereas previous trade relations have been primarily 
                                                           
6 In this EU-25 projection, net exports of the CEEC-10 countries are added to the total exports of the EU-
15 member states. Intra-trade within the CEECs (PC-TAS) and trade between the CEECs and the EU-15 
member states (Eurostat Comext) are excluded from the EU-25 total exports of sugar. Simultaneously, the 
total current access of non-member countries in the market of the net importers can be estimated by using 
the same base calculations and database. The estimations indicate that the combination of the ten CEECs 
should produce net imports instead of net exports, whereby the net imports are counter-balanced by the 
current-access quota of non-members’ (based on historical market access in the CEECs). Consequently, 
the combination of the ten CEECs will bring no additional quota-sugar exports to the total quota-sugar 
exports of the EU-15 member states (Huan-Niemi, 2003a).  H UAN-NIEMI AND NIEMI 
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based on non-reciprocal trade preferences granted by the EU to ACP exports, both 
parties have agreed now to enter into economic integration agreements (new WTO-
compatible trading arrangements), progressively remove barriers and enhance 
cooperation in all areas related to trade. To this end, the Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs) will be negotiated with the ACPs and applied in a regional 
economic integration process. Formal negotiations of the EPAs started in September 
2002 and the EPAs will enter into force by 1 January 2008 at the latest. The unilateral 
trade preferences will continue to be applied during the interim period of 2000 to 2007.  
The ACPs are not eager to engage in regional economic integration that leads to the 
creation of a free-trade area. These countries have reservations about the possible 
negative effects of trade liberalisation on their economies. Studies have shown that the 
creation of a free-trade area between the EU and the ACPs will have negative effects on 
the gross domestic product (GDP) of the ACPs. The negative effects are mainly based 
on the declining price level of commodities in the ACPs. In contrast, the previous Lomé 
Convention has shown positive effects of creating market access to the products from 
the ACPs even though it is often claimed that the preferential market access has not 
created any permanent growth in opportunities (Kerkelä et al., 2000 and McQueen, 
1999). 
At present, 77 ACPs are signatories to the Cotonou Agreement signed in June 2000 
comprising: 48 African states (covering all sub-Saharan Africa), 15 states in the 
Caribbean and 14 states in the Pacific. Yet, only 19 ACPs are signatories to the 
ACP/EU Sugar Protocol (see Appendix 1). In the Sugar Protocol, the EU has pledged to 
import 1.3 million tonnes of quota-sugar from ACPs at guaranteed prices on a duty-free 
basis. This privileged treatment of the ACPs has deep historical roots. Most of the ACPs 
are former colonies of the EU member countries. When the EU was formed, the 
overseas dependencies of Belgium, France, Italy and the Netherlands were given 
associated status. These dependencies gained independence in the 1960s, but continued 
to maintain close economic links with the EU through the Yaounde Conventions and the 
Arusha Agreement. When Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom joined in 1973, it 
was agreed that the developing countries of the British Commonwealth, except those in 
Asia, should receive similar associated status. In 1975, the EU entered into a new 
contractual agreement known as the Lomé Convention with 46 ACPs, followed by 
Lomé II in 1979 with 58 ACPs, Lomé III in 1984 with 65 ACPs, Lomé IV in 1989 with 
68 ACPs, which was extended in 1995 to 70 ACPs.  
During the Uruguay Round, the fixed-standard tariffs and the additional import duties 
under the Special Safeguard Provisions have made the import of non-preferential sugar 
uneconomic in comparison with the price of EU quota-sugar in the internal market. 
Subsequently, only a very small amount of non-preferential sugar is imported. Also, the 
Uruguay Round commitments under minimum access have not increased sugar imports 
to the EU. The import quotas given to the ACPs amounted to 10% of EU domestic 
sugar consumption, which is clearly above the 5% market access required under the 
Uruguay Round. Moreover, further market access is given through the import quotas 
from the Agreement on Special Preferential Sugar
7 (SPS) with 17 ACPs and India (see 
                                                           
7 The SPS agreement with the ACPs was reached on 1 June 1995, and, similar to the ACP/EU Sugar 
Protocol, it is a government-to-government agreement; but unlike the Protocol, it is of a fixed duration 
and the ACPs are jointly supplying the quantities of sugar covered by the SPS agreement. The current  T HE IMPACT OF PREFERENTIAL, REGIONAL AND MULTILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 
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Appendix 2). Hence, the EU has been able to prevent competition from imported sugar 
that is outside its preferential trade agreement with the ACPs. 
The preferential market access of ACP sugar to the EU and the support of preferential 
sugar have a distorting influence on world market conditions. The higher prices 
received for raw sugar result in higher returns and higher sugar production in the ACPs. 
The extra production is indirectly fed onto the world sugar market through larger, 
supported EU sugar exports. The extra volume reaching the world sugar market reduces 
the market prices received by countries that do not have access to the EU market. Thus, 
the ACP/EU Sugar Protocol discriminates against sugar exporting countries that are 
outside the Sugar Protocol (Roberts and Whish-Wilson, 1991). Such discrimination is 
one of the original reasons for Brazil’s WTO challenge to the EU sugar exports. Brazil 
is unhappy that the EU is allowed to re-export an amount equivalent to 1.6 million 
tonnes outside of the export subsidy commitments that limit subsidised sugar exports 
from the EU in the Uruguay Round (Agra Europe, 2002). 
2.4  The Least Developed Countries – preferential agreements with a unilateral 
concession (‘Everything but Arms’ concession under the Generalised System 
of Preferences ) 
The United Nations has denominated a ‘Least Developed Country’ (LDC) category for 
those countries (presently 49) that are deemed structurally handicapped in their 
development process since 1971. In response to the socio-economic weaknesses of the 
LDCs, the United Nations grants these countries especially favourable treatment in the 
allocation of resources under its relevant cooperation programmes. At the same time, 
the organisation gives a strong signal to the other development partners of the LDCs, by 
periodically identifying these countries and highlighting their structural problems, 
thereby pointing to the need for special concessions in their favour, especially in the 
area of development finance and in the multilateral trade framework. 
At present, the EU is the most important single market for the exports of the LDCs. In 
2001 (according to WTO statistics), the EU is the largest importer of agricultural 
products from Africa, with imports worth $11.5 billion, followed by Japan ($1.3 
billion), the US ($1.1 billion) and Canada ($187 million). Over 50% of the exports from 
the LDCs were sold to the EU market in the year 2000, compared with 37% in 1999. 
Among the 49 LDCs, 15 of these are dependent on the EU market (United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD], 2002). The orientation of exports 
from the LDCs towards the EU market is partly explained by the relatively low tariff 
barriers involved in the EU market. Out of the 49 LDCs included in the EBA 
concession, 39 of them also benefited from preferential market access under the ACP-
EU Partnership Agreement (Cotonou Agreement). 
                                                                                                                                                                          
SPS agreement is for an initial period of six years, matching the duration of the new sugar regime (ending 
in June 2006) and the refiners’ rights to refine raw sugar. The SPS sugar imports have been ranging from 
344,000 tonnes in 1995/1996 to 217,000 tonnes in 2002/2003.  H UAN-NIEMI AND NIEMI 
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The ‘Everything but Arms’ (EBA) unilateral trade concession
8 from the EU is intended 
to further improve trading opportunities for the LDCs. All agricultural products are 
included in the concession, which is in contrast with the original Generalised System of 
Preferences (GSP) concession to the LDCs that focused on manufactured products. 
Although the market access of LDCs in the EU had a wide coverage of products before 
the EBA concession, a further 919 agricultural products (tariff lines at Harmonised 
System [HS] 8-digit level) are freed from ad valorem or specific duties and import 
quotas. Now, agricultural products such as fruit and vegetables, meat, beverages and 
dairy products are granted ‘duty and quota-free access’ to the EU market with the 
exception of sugar, rice and bananas. 
The EU’s initiative to eliminate duty and quota for essentially all products except arms 
and ammunition originating from the LDCs took effect in March 2001 (EU Council 
Regulation [EC]416/2001). In spite of this, the full liberalisation of sugar, rice and 
bananas will be phased in during a transition period.
9 The ‘duty and quota-free’ market 
access for sugar will only begin in year 2009. Nevertheless, in order to compensate for 
the delay in the full liberalisation of sugar, raw sugar
10 can be exported duty-free by the 
LDCs to the EU market within the limits of a tariff quota, which will be increased each 
year by 15% from 74,185 tonnes (white-sugar equivalent) in 2001/2002 to 197,355 
tonnes in 2008/2009. This is not an indication, however, that there will be additional 
imports flowing into the EU sugar market. The increase in the LDCs’ sugar imports 
through this tariff quota will simultaneously decrease the imports of SPS sugar from the 
ACPs (see Appendix 2). Currently, only 13 members
11 out of the 49 LDCs are eligible 
to export raw sugar under this tariff quota (see Appendix 3).  
The EU Commission initially estimated that 2.7 million tonnes of sugar may enter the 
EU market by year 2009 (European Commission, EBA Proposal, 2000). From this total, 
1.4 million tonnes would be from the substitution of domestic consumption from world 
sugar imports, while the domestic production of sugar is exported to the more lucrative 
EU market. Meanwhile, 1.3 million tonnes would come from the medium term 
enhancement of the LDCs production capacity in sugar. Later, the EU Commission 
gave a second estimation that sugar imports from the LDCs would gradually increase to 
900,000 tonnes in the medium term (European Commission, EBA Proposal, 2001). The 
lower estimation is because of the infrastructure costs, constraints (in particular for 
land-locked producers) and the unfavourable investment climate (including political 
stability) facing the LDCs at present. Most probably, it would take time before the 
                                                           
8 The provisions of the EBA Regulation (European Council Regulation (EC) No 416/2001 of 28 February 
2001) have been incorporated into the GSP Regulation (European Council Regulation (EC) No 
2501/2001). The EBA regulation foresees that the special arrangements for LDCs should be maintained 
for an unlimited period of time and not be subject to the periodic renewal of the EU’s scheme of 
generalised preferences. Therefore, the date of expiry of European Council Regulation (EC) No 
2501/2001 does not apply to its EBA provisions. 
9 Duties on sugar will be reduced by 20% on 1 July 2006, by 50% on 1 July 2007, by 80% on 1 July 2008 
and eliminated by 1 July 2009. Duties on rice will be reduced by 20% on 1 September 2006, by 50% on 1 
September 2007, by 80% on 1 September 2008 and eliminated by 1 September 2009. Duties on fresh 
bananas will be reduced by 20% annually, starting on 1 January 2002 and eliminated on 1 January 2006. 
10 The EU’s minimum purchase price for raw sugar from the LDCs is €496.8 per tonne. The world market 
price for raw sugar (New York No. 11) is between the range of  €130 to  €200 per tonne (Sugartraders). 
11 These countries have signed the Framework Agreement with the EU.  T HE IMPACT OF PREFERENTIAL, REGIONAL AND MULTILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 
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LDCs would be able to overcome the existing constraints in infrastructure, logistics, 
marketing, quality and other areas, not to mention political instability (civil war or 
unrest) and economic mismanagement. 
According to a study conducted by UNCTAD in 2002, it is estimated that sugar exports 
from the LDCs to the EU market would increase by only 50,000 to 100,000 tonnes, 
based on the results generated by the partial equilibrium SMART model.
12 The result 
may be an indication that the non-trade barriers are quite substantial in blocking the 
sugar exports from the LDCs to the EU even after the duty and quota-free market 
concession from the EU to the LDCs.  
One very important non-trade barrier is the safeguard measures enacted to protect the 
EU market from serious disturbances. The EU Commission has stated that, if in any 
given marketing year, imports into the EU from the LDCs for sugar, rice and bananas 
exceed or are likely to exceed imports in the previous marketing year by more than 
25%, the EU Commission will automatically examine whether the conditions for 
applying safeguard measures
13 in accordance with the GSP Regulation are met. 
Moreover, the EU is entitled to the application of safeguard measures provided for in 
the Agreement on Safeguards under Article XIX of the GATT 1994. 
Any imports of sugar in the range of 900,000 to 2.7 million tonnes from the LDCs to the 
EU market will cause serious disturbances and trigger the safeguard measures. The 
safeguard measures under the GSP Regulation may temporarily withdraw the duty and 
quota-free market access to the EU market. After that, the normal border protection for 
EU sugar will come into place. In addition, if the normal border protection is not 
enough, the EU may apply quantitative restrictions or additional duties on the sugar 
imports under the safeguard measures of the GATT 1994. The safeguard measures are 
in place to protect the EU market from massive influx of sugar imports from the LDCs. 
The emerging questions will be whether it is politically correct to impose the safeguard 
measures on the LDCs, when the EU has committed itself to opening its market fully to 
the world’s poorest countries or whether the EU will protect its market because of 
internal pressures from the sugar industry and producers. 
Another issue is the fact that the EU has the obligation, under the ACP/EU Sugar 
Protocol, to purchase a fixed amount of ACP sugar at the EU intervention price. 
Possible trade diversion from the ACPs to the LDCs may occur because EU refineries 
may switch buying raw sugar from the ACPs to the LDCs. If the ACPs are unable to 
sell their raw sugar to the EU market, the EU may be forced to publicly buy the raw 
sugar into intervention stores, causing further expenses to the EU budget. Nevertheless, 
the UNCTAD study in 2002 indicated that trade diversion from the ACPs is not 
substantial. For example, the SMART model estimated that the largest ACP sugar 
exporters, such as Mauritius and Fiji, would see their current level of exports reduced 
                                                           
12 See Laird and Yeats (1986) for a technical description of the model, methodology and data uses. 
13 The preferential arrangements provided under the GSP Regulation may be temporarily withdrawn, 
where imports under these arrangements massively exceed the usual levels of production and export 
capacity of that country (GSP Regulation, Article 30:1:b). Where a product originating in a beneficiary 
country is imported on terms that cause, or threaten to cause, serious difficulties to a Community 
producer of like or directly competing products, normal Common Customs Tariff duties on that product 
may be reintroduced at any time at the request of a member state or on the Commission’s initiative (GSP 
Regulation, Article 31).  H UAN-NIEMI AND NIEMI 
  14 
by 5% and 2.4% respectively. Trade diversion from the ACPs to the LDCs may be 
small from 2001 to 2009 because sugar imports from the LDCs are restricted by quota 
during the transition period for the sugar sector. Yet, after the transition period, sugar 
imports from the LDCs to the EU market will be quota-free and duty-free as well. Trade 
diversion from Mauritius may be quite substantial after 2009, because sugar can be 
imported from the LDCs quota-free. Furthermore, Mauritius is a high-cost cane sugar 
producer compared with the more efficient and lower cost producers of cane sugar such 
as Sudan, Mozambique, Zambia, Malawi and Ethiopia. 
Preferential market access is very lucrative at present, owing to the high price for EU 
sugar and well-protected sugar market. The forthcoming reforms
14 on the EU sugar 
regime may have a major impact on the sugar exports of the LDCs. A drastic cut in the 
intervention price for sugar may correspond to a big drop in the LDCs’ earnings from 
sugar exports to the EU. Full liberalisation of the EU sugar regime will mostly benefit 
countries outside the EU preferential trade agreements, since neither the LDCs nor the 
ACPs can compete with sugar producers from Brazil, Australia and Thailand. The 
LDCs may no longer gain from preferential market access to the EU sugar market if the 
EU sugar regime is fully liberalised. 
2.5  The Balkans – bilateral agreements with unilateral concessions (Stabilisation 
and Association Agreements leading to Free Trade Agreements in the future) 
In the year 2000, the EU granted autonomous trade concessions to five countries of the 
Balkans or South Eastern Europe (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro), making it possible for 
around 95% of their exports to enter the EU duty-free. The EU has offered these 
countries the possibility of full integration into the EU structures; they are potential 
candidates for accession to the EU, and are being offered tailor-made Stabilisation and 
Association Agreements. The agreements, over a transitory period, render these trade 
concessions reciprocal, thereby gradually opening up the markets of the region to EU 
products. 
The EU ranks number one in both the region’s imports (55% of total) and exports 
(57%). Total trade with the EU has increased by 40% since 1999. The candidate 
countries represent the second largest trade partner of the region, accounting for 21% of 
imports and 13% of exports. 
Previously the Balkan trade agreements have raised relatively few problems for EU 
producers, other than indications at the end of year 2000 that small quantities of 
Croatian sugar had been exported to Germany. The Balkan accord includes a quota 
system for wine and beef, but trade in sugar is fully liberalised. Currently fears are 
mounting that the Balkan sugar being imported duty-free into the EU may not be 
genuinely home-grown, as required by the rules of the Balkan accord. According to 
figures from the Committee of European Sugar Producers (CEFS), exports of sugar 
from the western Balkans rose from 613 tonnes in the year 2000, when duty-free access 
was granted, to 228,332 tonnes in 2002. The European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) has 
                                                           
14 The studies carried out by Frandsen et al. (2003), Koo (2002), Piketty and Boussard (2002), Bureau et 
al. (2001), Poonyth et al. (2000), Devadoss and Kropf (1996), Alas (1996), Roberts and Whish-Wilson 
(1991) have evaluated the impact of alternative reforms in the EU sugar policy and trade liberalisation in 
the sugar sector.  T HE IMPACT OF PREFERENTIAL, REGIONAL AND MULTILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 
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harboured ‘serious doubts’ whether western Balkan sugar exporters are complying with 
the terms of the Balkan accord, and have stepped up measures to pre-empt the prospect 
of fraudulent imports (Agra Europe, 2003b). 
The EU Commission agreed in April 2003
15 to suspend the special trade agreements 
with Serbia and Montenegro for at least three months, following the advice from OLAF 
that the origin of sugar coming duty-free into the EU from Serbian and Montenegro 
could not be verified. The major concern is that these countries could be involved in 
‘carousel’ trade. EU sugar exported to Serbia and Montenegro, was fraudulently 
declared to be of Serbian-Montenegrin origin, and then re-imported into the EU at a 
zero tariff. Moreover, the EU sugar was exported from the EU with the support of 
export refund. Suspicions have been strengthened by the fact that sugar imports into the 
EU from the western Balkans – primarily Croatia and Serbia & Montenegro – have 
climbed significantly since the beginning of 2001, while sugar flows in the opposite 
direction have also sped up. The EU initially responded in February 2003 by suspending 
export refunds on shipments of white sugar, raw sugar and syrups to the western 
Balkans. Meanwhile, the EU Commission and the competent authorities of Serbia and 
Montenegro are to look into bolstering the control systems to put a stop to the circular 
trade and regain the duty-free import access for Serbia and Montenegro. Without duty-
free access, the high standard tariffs or border protection will apply for sugar coming 
from Serbia and Montenegro, effectively making the imports of sugar from this region 
economically impossible. 
These safeguard measures are politically sensitive, as preferential trade arrangements 
form a central plank in the EU’s strategy to shore up the region’s stability in the 
aftermath of the Balkan war. In the future, this will be a precedent case for the 
‘Everything But Arms’ initiative to the LDCs, given that LDCs-sugar will be able to 
enter the EU duty-free by year 2009. 
2.6  The Overseas Countries and Territories – bilateral agreement with a 
unilateral concession (Association Agreement) 
The OCTs are countries that have a special relationship with one of the member states 
of the EU. The OCTs have been associated with the EU since the 1957 Treaty of Rome 
that provides for the associate status of these countries or territories. The GATT had 
already accepted the EU’s Association Agreement with the OCTs in 1971. The new 
OCTs association arrangements
16 are designed to achieve four objectives set out in the 
1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, namely: promoting the economic and social development of 
the OCTs more effectively; developing economic relations between the OCTs and the 
EU; taking greater account of the diversity and specific characteristics of the individual 
OCTs; and finally, improving the effectiveness of financial instruments.  
                                                           
15 European Commission Regulation (EC) No 764/2003 of 30 April 2003 suspends for a period of three 
months, with regard to sugar of CN codes 1701 and 1702 imported from Serbia and Montenegro, the 
arrangements provided for in European Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2000 introducing exceptional 
trade measures for countries and territories participating in or linked to the European Union’s 
Stabilisation and Association process. 
16 European Council Decision 2001/822/EC of 27 November 2001 on the association of the overseas 
countries and territories with the European Community, Official Journal of the European Communities 
(2001), L314, 11 November and L324, 7 December. This Council Decision will remain in force until 
2011.  H UAN-NIEMI AND NIEMI 
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Two main characteristics distinguish the OCTs from the ACPs and the French Overseas 
Departments (DOM): 1) the OCTs are not part of the EU territory and, 2) in contrast to 
the DOM, OCTs inhabitants have the nationality of the EU member states to which they 
are related. The OCTs are constitutionally linked to four of the EU member states: 
Denmark, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Differing from the ACPs, 
OCTs are not independent countries. 
The OCTs benefit from preferential market access to the EU market. Products 
originating from the OCTs imported into the EU are not subject to import duties or 
quantitative restrictions. These arrangements are nonreciprocal, in other words, products 
originating from the EU are subject to the import duties established by the OCTs. 
Additionally, the OCTs gain from the accumulation of origin with the ACPs. The 
possibility of the accumulation of origin stipulates that a product exported to the EU 
from an OCT, but composed of products from an ACP country (or another OCTs or the 
EU) may benefit from these preferential arrangements. The new OCTs regulation 
(European Council Decision 2001/822/EC) makes substantial changes in relation to the 
import of certain sensitive foodstuffs, especially those imported from the OCTs under 
the principle of the accumulation of origin. The EU markets have been seriously 
disrupted by the widespread arrival of sugar and rice grown mainly by other non-
member countries, but processed and exported as that of OCTs origin. As a result, the 
possibility of the accumulation of origin for sugar will gradually be removed and will 
no longer be possible after January 2011.  
In January 1998, an annual import quota for 3,000 tonnes of sugar was imposed on 
sugar coming from the OCTs. Imports of sugar from the OCTs within this import quota 
will be considered duty-free. Imports outside this quota will be under the normal border 
protection for sugar (no duty-free access), unless the sugar is heavily processed into a 
product that is not under the tariff heading for sugar. This quota became necessary as 
operators in the OCTs were threatening to flood the EU market with sugar originating 
from the ACPs, which had been very lightly processed (e.g. cubed or with molasses 
added). The new OCTs regulation has also provided a safeguard clause that may be 
used if the EU markets are disrupted excessively. In 1999, the OCTs tried to circumvent 
the import quotas imposed on sugar, but the EU Commission applied safeguard 
measures to prevent the import of sugar and cocoa mixtures from the OCTs. Currently, 
the EU Commission has increased the import quotas to 4,848 tonnes, but this quota 
includes sugar and mixtures with high sugar content. 
3.  Conclusions 
The reform of the EU sugar regime will affect not only the EU member states and 
candidates, but also countries that are associated with the EU through the preferential, 
regional and multilateral trade agreements. For several decades, the EU has supported 
and protected the EU sugar sector. Sugar from developing countries will not be able to 
enter the EU sugar market without preferential trade agreements. In the EU sugar 
regime, the unique features of the trade concessions are that sugar under preferential 
import quotas can enter the EU market duty-free and the price paid for sugar equals to 
the high EU price for sugar.  
One crucial issue for the ACPs is whether the EU will continue the ACP/EU Sugar 
Protocol after the end of the Cotonou Agreement in 2008. The Sugar Protocol explicitly  T HE IMPACT OF PREFERENTIAL, REGIONAL AND MULTILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 
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states that the EU undertakes, for an ‘indefinite period’, to purchase and import, at 
guaranteed prices, specific quantities of cane sugar that originate from the ACPs. But 
the EU Commission is currently examining options for reforming the sugar regime, 
most of which involve substantial cuts in the EU’s guaranteed price for sugar. These 
price cuts would inevitably be reflected in the prices paid to the ACP producers. The 
EU Commission has indicated to the sugar producers in ACPs that the inflated prices 
they receive under the Sugar Protocol are unsustainable in the long term. 
Similarly, the EU’s initiative to eliminate duties and quotas for sugar imports from the 
LDCs is pressuring the EU to reform the sugar sector in order to avoid a major influx of 
sugar coming from the LDCs. The main questions are what the supply capacity of the 
LDCs will be and how the ‘rules of origin’ will affect the amount of sugar entering the 
EU market. Moreover, the Everything but Arms trade concession allows accumulation 
among the LDCs and ASEAN,
17 SAARC
18 and the EU. The lucrative EU sugar market 
will attract both genuine and fraudulent trade in sugar because of the high EU price for 
sugar compared with the world market price. Both the ‘safeguard cases’ involving the 
OCTs and western Balkan countries have shown that the EU Commission is willing to 
make use of the safeguard measures stipulated in the preferential market access 
agreements. It remains to be seen whether the EU Commission is going to impose the 
safeguard measures on the imports of duty-free sugar from the LDCs or if there will be 
a flood of sugar from LDCs after 2009. 
The pressure from the WTO multilateral agreement to reduce import tariffs will 
instigate reform in the high support price for EU sugar. The EU will not be able to keep 
its border protection for sugar without lowering the support price for sugar. In addition, 
the use of export subsidies may be substantially reduced or eliminated, while quota-
sugar exports are heavily dependent on export subsidies. Thus, exports of quota-sugar to 
the world market will not be possible without export subsidies, owing to the high EU 
price for sugar. Even the exports of non-quota sugar (C-sugar) are being challenged in 
the WTO because of the issue of cross-subsidisation from the high EU price for quota-
sugar. A possible multilateral agreement in Cancun (September 2003) with regard to the 
liberalisation of agricultural trade will contribute to the magnitude of the forthcoming 
reform in the EU sugar regime. 
 
 
                                                           
17 The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) consists of Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, 
Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.  
18 The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) consists of Bangladesh, Bhutan, 
India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.  18 
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APPENDIX 1 
THE IMPORT QUOTA FOR RAW SUGAR UNDER THE ACP/EU SUGAR 
PROTOCOL (19 COUNTRIES) 
 
 
ACPs  Agreed quantities 
(tonnes w.s.e.) 
Barbados 50,312.4 
Belize 40,348.8 
Congo 10,186.1 
Côte d’Ivoire  10,186.1 
Fiji 165,348.3 
Guyana 159,410.1 
Jamaica 118,696.0 
Kenya 0.0 
Madagascar 10,760.0 
Malawi 20,824.4 
Mauritius 491,030.5 
St Kitts Nevis  15,590.9 
Surinam 0.0 
Swaziland 117,844.5 
Tanzania 10,186.1 
Trinidad 43,751.0 
Uganda 0.0 
Zambia 0.0 
Zimbabwe 30,224.8 
Total 1,294,700.0 
  Source: ACP Sugar. 
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APPENDIX 2  
THE ALLOCATIONS OF SPECIAL PREFERENTIAL SUGAR (IMPORT QUOTA) 
FOR THE 17 ACPS AND INDIA 
 
 
(units: metric tonnes white sugar equivalent) 
  1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 
Barbados  0.0  2,500.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Belize  13,010.5  8,489.6 8,233.4 9,374.5  10,447.8  8,066.8 5,579.0 5,527.0 
Congo  3,025.7 2,021.5 1,815.1 1,891.7 2,376.5 3,623.2 2,554.3 2,249.3 
Côte  d’Ivoire  13,025.7 11,719.8  0.0  10,138.9 12,376.5 13,962.5  9,775.2  9,703.9 
Fiji 49,116.2  32,263.5  27,456.2 32,910.4 38,312.3 32,184.9 19,646.2 21,059.5 
Guyana  51,401.8 33,446.4 30,683.3 39,134.7 38,569.1 41,714.8 22,443.6 17,111.3 
Jamaica  38,273.6 25,317.3 24,599.6 28,373.9 37,842.4 34,868.6 17,931.0 18,893.5 
Kenya  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  3,486.4  11,275.7  10,908.4 
Madagascar  3,082.1 2,121.4 2,410.7 2,442.0 2,952.5 2,918.0  0.0  0.0 
Malawi  16,148.3 13,222.1 13,610.8 13,866.9 14,858.5 12,858.1 10,000.0  9,897.1 
Mauritius 13,139.3  44,095.5 64,241.3 78,450.6 37,648 14,017.9  43,101.2 21,266.2 
St Kitts Nevis  5,027.3  3,401.0  3,181.4 0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 
Swaziland  65,005.3 53,548.9 57,254.4 52,145.2 57,421.9 56,999.5 14,696.0 45,029.9 
Tanzania  2.687.9 1,531.9  393.2  1,925.5 2,376.5 3,500.0 2,520.1 2,182.7 
Trinidad  14,107.5  9,233.1  8,927.6  10,165.0 11,487.7 12,134.1  6,239.2  5,658.2 
Zambia  13,070.6 11,953.7 12,045.8 12,205.1 12,562.6 14,165.0 12,765.0 12,862.8 
Zimbabwe  33,978.2 31,134.6 35,147.1 30,975.8 27,388.5 29,520.6 24,921.4 24,948.0 
India  10,000.0 10,000.0 10,000.0 10,000.0 10,000.0 10,000.0 10,000.0 10,000.0 
Total  344,100.0 296,000.5 300,000.0 334,000.0 279,000.0 294,020.4 213,447.9 217,297.8 
Source: ACP Sugar. 
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APPENDIX 3 
THE EBA IMPORT QUOTA FOR RAW SUGAR UNDER THE FRAMEWORK 
AGREEMENT (13 COUNTRIES) 
 
 
(units: metric tonnes white sugar equivalent) 
  2001/02 2002/03 
Bangladesh 0.0  0.0 
Burkina Faso  7,073.3  7,237.5 
Burundi 0.0  0.0 
Congo DRC  0.0  0.0 
Ethiopia 14,298.0  14,689.3 
Madagascar 0.0  0.0 
Malawi 10,402.2  10,661.3 
Mozambique 8,331.4  8,384.2 
Nepal 0.0  8,970.1 
Sudan 16,256.7  17,036.8 
Tanzania 9,065.4  9,317.2 
Uganda 0.0  0.0 
Zambia 8,758.0  9,016.7 
Total 74,185.0  85,313.0 
Source: ACP Sugar.  
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